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This article analyses the determinants of the voluntary online local 
budget transparency (OLBT) of Croatian local governments. Budget trans-
parency is one of preconditions for enabling citizens’ participation and im-
proving public sector outcomes; however, the previous empirical results are 
ambiguous and inconclusive, with particular gaps for ex-socialist, Þ scally 
centralized countries. To contribute to the existing literature, this article uses 
the principal-agent and legitimacy theories and non-linear panel data mod-
els for the 2015-2017 period to analyse 128 cities and 428 municipalities in 
Croatia. The Þ ndings show that local governments with higher residents’ per 
capita income, population, Internet access, and administrative and Þ scal ca-
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pacity voluntarily publish more budget documents online. Policy recommen-
dations point to the urge for the reform of the country’s territorial and Þ scal 
organisation, the promotion of budget transparency in less developed cities/
municipalities and for education of citizens about budgets. The main study 
limitation is the absence of a qualitative analysis of observed documents.
Key words: budget transparency, panel data, probit, Croatia, local gov-
ernment, political economy
1. Introduction
Budget transparency (BT) and citizens’ participation are critical elements 
for the  efÞ cient public service delivery, government accountability and citizens 
trust, particularly at local government levels (e.g., OECD, 2017; Pina et al., 2010; 
Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007). 
Research on the determinants of BT is growing (e.g., Caba Pérez et al., 2005; 
Gandía & Archidona, 2008; Gesuele & Metallo, 2017; Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 
2015). The results at the local level are showing heterogeneity and dependency of 
determinants on the research context, e.g., voluntary vs. mandatory disclosure, 
date of publication, unit of measure, etc. (Alcaide-Muñoz & Rodríguez Bolívar, 
2015; Alcaide Muñoz et al., 2017). To assist practitioners, more research of deter-
minants of local budget transparency (LBT) is needed (Pina et al., 2010), espe-
cially in different research contexts.
The information and communication technologies (ICT) fostered the use of 
web-based tools, allowing governments to provide better information, facilitat-
ing  citizens’ access to information and enabling more constructive and effective 
participation in decision making (Wong & Welch, 2004). Regardless, a relatively 
small number of studies focus on online BT (e.g., Caba-Pérez et al., 2008; García-
Tabuyo et al., 2016; Laswad et al., 2005; Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 2015), and 
none on voluntary BT in an ex-socialist, Þ scally centralized country. 
This paper explores the effect of selected independent variables on the level 
of voluntary online local budget transparency (OLBT), measured by the Þ ve local 
budget documents - the year-end report, mid-year report, budget proposal, enacted 
budget and citizens’ budget -  published annually on 556 Croatian municipalities’ 
and cities’ websites, using the 2015-2017 panel data.  
The OLBT is deÞ ned as citizens’ ability to use the local government units’ 
(LGUs’) websites to obtain complete, accurate, timely and understandable budget 
information (Kopits & Craig, 1998; OECD, 2017; Ott et al., 2017). However, this 
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analysis  focuses only on timely and understandable presentation of documents (as 
Caba-Pérez et al., 2008; Laswad et al., 2005). Due to time and funding constraints, 
the completeness and accuracy of the information is not analysed. 
The next section presents the background and development of the hypoth-
eses for the determinants of OLBT, the third offers the data description and the 
research methodology, the fourth provides results, and the Þ fth gives discussion 
and conclusion.
2. Background and Development of Hypotheses
There is no commonly agreed deÞ nition of BT, maybe because of its multi-
dimensionality (Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 2015) and dependence on the research 
context. Although Þ scal and budget transparency are often used as synonyms (Alt 
et al, 2006; OECD, 2017), Þ scal transparency is a wider concept, including the 
structures, functions, Þ nancial position and activities of government units and 
their economic and social implications (Kopits & Craig, 1998). A growing number 
of authors are investigating the determinants of Þ scal transparency (Andreula et 
al., 2009; Esteller-Moré & Polo Otero, 2012). However, the reported ambiguous 
Þ ndings (e.g. political ideology, residents’ income) point to the importance of fur-
ther research of the context and country-speciÞ c characteristics. 
2.1 Theoretical Background
The information gap between citizens and the government is a major obstacle 
to effective and constructive public participation. The public-choice theory ex-
plains it as the principal-agent problem, arising when an agent (politician) decides 
on behalf of the principal (citizens) but attempts to act in his/her own interests, 
which may be contrary to the interests of the principal. The informational asym-
metry is then to the advantage of the agent, and the principals cannot be sure 
that the agents always represent their interests (Groenendijk, 1997). The Ferejohn 
(1999) model, in which the agent chooses how to make his/her actions evident to 
the principal, assumes that the incumbent is compensated with rents (re-election, 
advancement and current and future income) proportional to the scale of the gov-
ernment. The voters (also assumed to be self-interested) monitor the agents, be-
cause their wealth depends on the agents’ actions (Laswad et al., 2005). In this 
regard, voluntary disclosure has been seen as a method of reducing information 
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asymmetry, limiting the arising conß icts (Zimmerman, 1977; Banker & Patton, 
1987). 
Voluntary transparency can also be explained by legitimacy theory i.e. “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of any entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and deÞ nitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). If threatened, agents will dis-
close information to promote their legitimacy (Patten, 1992; Deegan, 2002). By 
voluntary transparency, they transmit the perception that their actions meet the 
principals’ expectations, hoping to regain their conÞ dence, changing the negative 
perceptions and enhancing their legitimacy and reputation (De Araújo & Tejedo-
Romero, 2016; Alcaide Muñoz et al., 2017). 
2.2 Development of Hypotheses
Motivated by the Þ ndings presented in Table 1, showing the ambiguity and 
heterogeneity of individual studies, and considering principal-agent and legitima-
cy theories, six hypotheses are developed in accordance with often-used socio-
demographic, Þ scal and political variables.
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2.2.1 Residents’ Income p.c.
Residents with higher incomes usually have greater Internet access and ex-
perience (Styles & Tennyson, 2007), demand additional public services (Giroux 
& McLelland, 2003; Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007) and information (Piotrowski 
& Van Ryzin, 2007).  By releasing information, politicians reduce the asymmetry 
and prove their legitimacy. LGUs with lower residents’ income p.c. are less likely 
to adopt progressive web design due to the lower demand (Ho, 2002). In this re-
gard, the technological and income levels are complementary (Serrano-Cinca et al., 
2008). While Guillamón et al. (2011) found no signiÞ cant correlation, Lowatcharin 
and MeniÞ eld (2015) showed a signiÞ cant positive correlation between residents’ 
income p.c. and government transparency. Therefore, we assumed that:
H1. As residents’ income p.c. increases, the level of OLBT increases.
2.2.2 Population
Larger LGUs are more often pressured to provide information (Moon & Nor-
ris, 2005; Serrano-Cinca et al., 2008), usually have higher revenues and an IT de-
partment (Caba-Pérez et al., 2008). Serrano-Cinca et al. (2008) argue that conß icts 
of interest are more likely in more populated areas and the advantage of disclosing 
information is correspondingly greater.
Several authors found a positive and statistically signiÞ cant relationship 
between population and data availability (Guillamón et al., 2011; del Sol, 2013; 
Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 2015; De Araújo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016). Therefore, 
we assumed that:
H2. As the population increases, the level of OLBT increases.
2.2.3 Access to the Internet
As the citizens’ Internet access increases, governments are expected to offer 
additional information and services online (Pina et al., 2010). New technologies 
facilitate online disclosure, especially in larger LGUs, reducing the costs of dis-
semination (García-Tabuyo et al., 2016).
Studies showed a positive relationship between Internet access and online 
mandatory disclosure (Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 2015; García-Tabuyo et al., 
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2016). Surprisingly, for voluntary online disclosure, García-Tabuyo et al. (2016) 
found a negative correlation. Therefore, we assumed that:
H3. As citizens’ access to the Internet increases, the level of OLBT increases.
2.2.4 Fiscal Capacity
Fiscal capacity (FC) can be deÞ ned as the ability to raise revenues for public 
spending (Martinez-Vazquez & Timofeev, 2008). The term Þ nancial autonomy 
could be used as a synonym (Tavares & da Cruz, 2014). Residents’ income p.c. is 
linked to the FC, since it implies higher tax and nontax revenues. Alcaide Muñoz 
et al. (2017) argue that larger cities are more likely to provide information, since 
they can afford it and that higher FC is followed by higher pressure to justify the 
use of resources, so agents are keen to show that they act responsibly. 
There are various proxies for the FC. Guillamón et al. (2011) used p.c. tax 
revenues and obtained a positive correlation with Þ nancial transparency. Laswad 
et al. (2005) used general revenues minus intergovernmental transfers Þ nding no 
signiÞ cant correlation with voluntary Internet Þ nancial reporting. This study also 
uses operating revenues (excluding grants) as a proxy for FC. Therefore, we as-
sumed that:
H4. As an LGU’s Þ scal capacity increases, the level of OLBT increases.
2.2.5 Administrative Capacity
The administrative capacity largely deÞ nes the ability to produce budget doc-
uments. Tavares and da Cruz (2014) show its inß uence associating it with a more 
professional organization and IT educated staff. This paper assumes that LGUs 
with a larger number of employees can more easily disclose more information. 
The proxy for administrative capacity here is the natural logarithm of the an-
nual average number of employees in LGU bodies (based on hours worked). This 
variable has not been previously used as a determinant of LBT.1 It assumes that 
LGUs with a larger number of employees have specialized staff able to devote ad-
ditional time to OLBT. Therefore, we assumed that:
1 Manoharan (2013) found that the number of IT employees was positively associated with 
website adoption.
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H5. As the number of employees in the LGU bodies increases, the level of 
OLBT increases.
2.2.6 Political Ideology 
Wehner and de Renzio (2013) argue that BT has often been characterized 
as a bipartisan issue promoted by both the left and right, even if for different 
reasons. Alteration of power motivates BT, as all parties want to ensure access to 
information should they be voted out of power. In contrast, Caamaño-Alegre et 
al. (2013) and Guillamón et al. (2011) argue that left-wing parties/incumbents are 
more transparent, as they are more likely to expand public services. 
While several papers did show a relationship between left-wing incumbents 
and greater transparency (e.g., Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013; del Sol, 2013), other 
showed the opposite (De Araújo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016, 2018). Therefore, we 
assumed that:
H6. A right-wing political incumbent decreases the level of OLBT.
3. Data and Methodology
Besides the sample and methodology, this section shows an overview of the 
local government organization and BT in Croatia, and the information on the used 
variables.
3.1 Local Government and BT in Croatia
Croatia consists of 428 municipalities, 128 cities and 20 counties. The Budget 
Act (2008) with subsequent amendments and the Act on the Right of Access to In-
formation (2013) require the online publication of a mid-year and year-end reports 
and the enacted budget. The Ministry of Finance (2012) recommended publishing 
budget proposals online and printing and/or posting the citizens’ budgets online. 
However, no sanctions are imposed. This paper considers online publication of 
three mandatory (mid-year and year-end reports and the enacted budget) and two 
voluntary documents (budget proposal and citizens’ budget).
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3.2 Dependent Variable and Sample
The dependent variable (OLBT) is constructed by using the Online Local 
Budget Index (OLBI) (Ott et al., 2015; 2016; 2017), a simple data count index for 
576 Croatian LGUs for three years (2015-2017). It measures the availability of 
Þ ve documents on LGUs websites (see Figure 1) chosen in accordance with the 
best international practices (e.g., OECD, 2002; IBP, 2016) and the Croatian legal 
requirements and recommendations. 
Figure 1. 
ONLINE LOCAL BUDGET INDEX OF CROATIAN CITIES 
AND MUNICIPALITIES 2017
Source: http://www.ijf.hr/transparency
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The annual OLBI ranges between zero and Þ ve (e.g., one if the LGU pub-
lished one, Þ ve if it published Þ ve documents). The overall average OLBI has im-
proved from 1.75 in 2015 to 3.1 in 2017. The most transparent were counties (aver-
age 4.6), followed by cities (3.7) and municipalities (2.8). 
Here, the OLBI is a binary variable, where 1 = transparent LGU (publishing 
four or Þ ve documents) and 0 otherwise. This classiÞ cation is made since publica-
tion of four or Þ ve documents includes the publication of at least one voluntary 
document. First, it was tested if the variances of the OLBI changed signiÞ cantly, as 
the variable was collapsed from six observations to the binary outcome. The Þ rst 
population was divided into six groups (publishing 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 documents) 
and the second into two groups (1 = publishing 4 or 5 budget documents and 0 
otherwise). The F-test conÞ rmed that variances of these two populations are equal. 
Therefore, the dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 (a transparent) 
or 0 (a nontransparent LGU).
The sample includes Croatian 428 municipalities and 128 cities.2 
3.3 Independent Variables
The independent variables are residents’ income (INC), population (POP), 
Internet access (INTERNET), Þ scal capacity (FC), administrative capacity (EM-
PLOYEE) and political ideology (RIGHT) (Table 2). Except political ideology, 
which stems from 2013 local elections, all include lag values (2014-2016).
2  Counties are not the subject of this study.
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Table 2.






OLBT A binary variable: 1 for an LGU publishing four or 
Þ ve  documents  (budget proposal, enacted budget, 
mid-year report, year-end report, citizens’ budget) 
and 0 otherwise (2015-2017)
Ott et al.  (2015; 2016; 
2017); 
Independent variables
INC A logarithm of the average residents’ income p.c. 
(2014-2016) 
positive Ministry of Regional 
Development and EU 
Funds (2017), CBS 
(2017)
POP A logarithm of the population estimate  (2014-2016) positive CBS (2017)
FC A logarithm of the annual Þ scal capacity p.c. 
(operating revenues minus all grants) (2014-2016)
positive Ministry of Finance  
(2017), CBS (2017)
INTERNET The percentage of households with Internet access 
(transmission speeds of over 2 Mbit) (2014-2016)
positive Croatian Regulatory 
Authority for Network 
Industries (2018)
EMPLOYEE A logarithm of the average annual absolute number 
of employees in LGU bodies (based on hours 
worked) (2014-2016)
positive Ministry of Finance 
(2017)
RIGHT A dummy variable: 1 if the incumbent is a member 
of the Croatian Democratic Union, Croatian 
Peasant Party, Croatian Democratic Alliance of 
Slavonia and Baranja or a coalition in which these 
parties participate (2013 local elections) 
negative State Election 
Commission (2017)
To test whether the independent variables affect OLBT, an estimate of how 
the probability of the online publication of four or Þ ve documents depends on the 
level of independent variables is determined. Probit panel data analysis is used.
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The following equation is estimated at the total sample level:
 (1)
 
where P represents the probability that an LGU achieves a higher level of BT (i.e., 
publishing four or Þ ve budget documents online) and  is a constant term, while 
the six independent variables are deÞ ned above. The seventh variable (i.e., CITY) 
denotes a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the LGU is a city and zero other-
wise. This variable is not included once the equation is estimated separately at the 
city and municipality level. In equation (1), i represents the city or municipality, t 
time, and  the parameters to be estimated, while e represents the error.
4. Results
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for dependent variable OLBT and the 
remaining six independent variables for the total (cities and municipalities), city 
and municipality samples. The mean value of OLBT is signiÞ cantly higher in the 
city sample than in the other two samples. The same Þ nding applies to the popu-
lation, the number of employees in the LGU bodies and Internet access, pointing 
to the necessity of conducting additional empirical investigations separately for 
cities and municipalities. The correlation matrices for the total, city and munici-
pality samples are presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively. They all conÞ rm 
that the selected variables, except for variable EMPLOYEE at the municipal level, 
have a statistical signiÞ cant linear relationship with OLBT and that the direction 
of relationship is as the theory suggests (e.g. positive for population). Addition-
ally, due to the multicollinearity problems between our independent variables (e.g. 
income internet access, population employees) we have estimated four different 
models at the total (city+municipality), city and municipality level.
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Table 3.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Obs. Mean. Std. Dev. Min. Max.
OLBI 1 668 0.2577938 0.437551 0 1
POP 1 668 8.104642 0.992633 4.867534 13.59692
INC 1 668 10.06441 0.2735261 9.06943 10.87998
FC 1 668 7.602155 0.6699641 5.974857 9.757328
EMPLOYEE 1 568 2.367982 0.9770358 0 7.957877
INTERNET 1 668 42.61448 15.42516 0 99.68
RIGHT 1 668 0.5125899 0.4999914 0 1
City sample
OLBI 384 0.5026042 0.5006455 0 1
POP 384 9.31659 0.9701179 7.31322 13.59692
INC 384 10.25165 0.1887675 9.787732 10.87998
FC 384 7.917304 0.5543017 6.644843 9.757328
EMPLOYEE 372 3.528552 0.923424 1.098612 7.957877
INTERNET 384 49.1203 12.88347 12.60288 99.52
RIGHT 384 0.5 0.5006523 0 1
Municipality sample
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Table 4. 
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE TOTAL SAMPLE




INC 0.3056 0.3217 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000
FC 0.2137 0.1123 0.6714 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
EMPLOYEE 0.3134 0.7877 0.3548 0.3484 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RIGHT -0.0889 -0.0266 -0.1577 -0.1313 -0.0196 1.0000
0.0003 0.2777 0.0000 0.0000 0.4369
INTERNET 0.2226 0.3097 0.5593 0.6354 0.3095 -0.1228 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CITY 0.3061 0.6679 0.3745 0.2573 0.6627 -0.0138 0.2307 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5740 0.0000
Table 5. 
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE CITY SAMPLE




INC 0.4264 0.3615 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000
FC 0.2394 0.0664 0.6299 1.0000
0.0000 0.1940 0.0000
EMPLOYEE 0.3226 0.8644 0.4156 0.3276 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RIGHT -0.1927 -0.0628 -0.3703 -0.2212 -0.0995 1.0000
0.0001 0.2198 0.0000 0.0000 0.0552
INTERNET 0.2511 0.2708 0.5220 0.7140 0.4096 -0.1871 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
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Table 6. 
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE MUNICIPALITY SAMPLE




INC 0.1685 0.0310 1.0000
0.0000 0.2668
FC 0.1208 -0.1412 0.6451 1.0000
0.0000 0.1940 0.0000
EMPLOYEE 0.0457 0.4524 0.0727 0.2177 1.0000
0.1139 0.0000 0.0119 0.0000
RIGHT -0.0497 -0.0065 -0.1234 -0.1108 0.0223 1.0000
0.0749 0.8169 0.0000 0.0001 0.4410
INTERNET 0.1403 0.2043 0.5256 0.5921 0.1483 -0.1075 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Probit random effect models are estimated for the total (Table 7), city (Table 
8) and municipality (Table 9) samples. In each of these estimations, four different 
probit models are executed due to collinearity between the independent variables 
(e.g., residents’ income p.c. is correlated with Internet access and the LGUs’ Þ scal 
capacities); and their calculated marginal effects are presented.3 
3 A logit random effect model and a linear probability model (LPM) were also estimated. 
The results obtained were exactly the same in all the estimated logit models, while in the LPMs at 
the total sample level, the only difference was that the political ideology variable was statistically 
signiÞ cant in the Þ rst model. The results are available upon request.
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In the total sample (Table 7), both population (with marginal effects ranging 
from 0.09 to 0.983) and residents’ income p.c. (with marginal effects ranging from 
0.415 to 0.434) have a positive and statistically signiÞ cant inß uence on the OLBT 
in all the estimated models. This Þ nding is in line with the Þ ndings (del Sol, 2013; 
Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 2015; De Araujo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016). In addi-
tion, Internet access (with marginal effects of 0.006), FC (with marginal effects of 
0.117) and the number of employees in the LGU bodies (with marginal effects of 
0.068) estimated in the separate models show a positive and statistically signiÞ -
cant inß uence at all the usual signiÞ cance levels. This article thus reports the Þ rst 
statistically signiÞ cant Þ nding in the literature regarding the number of employ-
ees. By conÞ rming the positive inß uence of Internet access, the results are in line 
with García-Tabuyo et al. (2016), Caba-Pérez et al. (2008) and Lowatcharin and 
MeniÞ eld (2015), while the results for FC are in line with Guillamón et al. (2011). 
However, the political ideology variable has an expected negative sign in all the 
estimated models, but it is statistically signiÞ cant only in the models estimating 
the effect of population, FC and Internet access (it is not signiÞ cant in models with 
residents’ income p.c.). Although the coefÞ cients for political ideology are rather 
similar in all four models, a robust conÞ rmation cannot be reported. Consequently, 
this hypothesis is only partially accepted, while the others are accepted.
The analysis of the city sample was conducted because the dummy variable 
denoting cities in the total sample was found to be signiÞ cant in three of four 
models, but the obtained results are identical to those reported for the total sample. 
However, in the city sample (Table 8), residents’ income p.c. has the highest mar-
ginal effect (ranging from 1.95 to 1.982), and the political ideology variable has a 
negative and statistically signiÞ cant inß uence only in models with population and 
Internet access (marginal effect of -0.27) and in the model with FC (marginal ef-
fect of -0.245). Finally, the results regarding the effect of the number of employees 
in LGU bodies are clearly driven by the effect in the city sample, in which a posi-
tive and statistically signiÞ cant marginal effect of 0.251 was reported.
The results at the municipality level (Table 9) show the expected negative 
sign for political ideology, although the result was nonsigniÞ cant, leading to the 
conclusion that this variable does not inß uence the OLBT in any of the estimated 
four models. The same goes for employees of LGU bodies, which is why these two 
hypotheses at the municipality level are rejected. The Þ ndings might indicate that 
higher levels of OLBT are unaffected by ideology and the number of employees at 
the municipality level, but additional empirical research is needed to conÞ rm this 
conclusion. However, the results indicate other interesting Þ ndings.  First, popula-
tion and residents’ income p.c. remain the most important determinants. Second, 
the calculated marginal effects are much lower in this sample. Third, the vari-
able residents’ income p.c. (marginal effects between 0.229 and 0.253) is the most 
inß uential. In the fourth model, residents’ income p.c. accounts for all the varia-
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tions, leaving the number of employees in LGU bodies statistically nonsigniÞ cant. 
Fourth, both Internet accessibility (marginal effect of 0.003) and the proxy vari-
able for FC (marginal effect of 0.074) remain statistically signiÞ cant with a posi-
tive sign. 
Finally, in all three samples, residents’ income p.c., population, Internet ac-
cess and FC were always statistically signiÞ cant with the expected positive sign. 
However, residents’ income p.c. has the strongest impact at the city and municipal-
ity levels. The current size and wealth of LGUs determine the level of OLBT and 
not, for example, the party afÞ liation of the incumbent. Since both Internet access 
and FC are theoretically a clear externality of size and wealth of LGU, this is fur-
ther conÞ rmed in the empirical analysis.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The paper addresses the determinants of voluntary OLBT in Croatian 428 
municipalities and 128 cities in 2015-2017 period, using probit panel data models 
at three different sample levels to conÞ rm the proposed hypotheses.
The Þ rst hypothesis is accepted, i.e. residents’ income p.c. has direct and 
indirect effects on voluntary OLBT. Directly, according to the principal-agent and 
legitimacy theories, it is expected that residents with higher incomes tend to expect 
additional public services, have more access to and experience using the Internet, 
demanding increased online budget information. However, there might be a low 
demand for budget information among ex-socialist citizens, often unaware of and 
unaccustomed to using their rights. According to the Ott and Broni  (2015) survey 
concerning citizen participation in Þ scal and budgetary processes in Croatia, 55% 
of the respondents believe that it is possible for citizens to be involved and 80% 
that citizens should be involved; however, a mere 7% have attempted to participate. 
Furthermore, especially in centralized countries, it is expected that citizens are 
less interested in LBT since less public goods are provided locally. In addition, 
according to the principal-agent and legitimacy theories, incumbents in LGUs 
with higher residents’ income p.c. also have increased motivation to be voluntarily 
transparent. It is in their interest to disclose budget information to demonstrate 
how successfully they manage public funds.
Residents’ incomes also indirectly affect OLBT through FC. Higher average 
residents’ income p.c. leads to higher FC, enabling higher budget revenues and ad-
ditional resources for voluntarily BT. 
In all three samples, along with residents’ income p.c., FC, population and 
Internet access were always statistically signiÞ cant with the expected positive 
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sign. As argued in  literature, higher income p.c. is directly linked to purchases 
of computers and technological devices. In such LGUs, due to greater Internet ac-
cess, a higher demand for OLBT is expected. According to both principal-agent 
and legitimacy theories, higher voluntary OLBT is expected in LGUs with larger 
populations.
These results add to the literature. First, they prove that residents’ income 
p.c. is a major determinant of voluntary OLBT in an ex-socialist, Þ scally central-
ized state (with numerous small LGUs, often with low capacities and uninterested 
citizens). Second, a positive effect of the proxy for an LGU’s FC is empirically 
conÞ rmed in all three samples. Third, there is a clear positive effect of the number 
of employees in the LGU bodies on voluntary OLBT. 
As voluntary OLBT is important for citizens’ participation, government’s ac-
countability and efÞ ciency of public goods provisions, the Þ ndings offer policy 
implications. First, the number of LGUs with low Þ scal (and often administrative) 
capacity should be reduced through territorial and Þ scal reorganization (including 
mergers or joint provision of public goods). Second, it is necessary to promote BT 
in less developed cities/municipalities. Third, with improved BT, citizens should 
be able to engage and participate in the local budget processes. However, they 
should Þ rst be educated (e.g. through budget literacy programs). 
The results are robust and signiÞ cant. However, with a longer time span and 
improved data availability, further studies might include qualitative analysis of the 
documents, employ other methods or analyse additional determinants (e.g. elec-
toral cycles, education levels, civil society organizations’ activities, indebtedness, 
corruption).
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ODREDNICE DOBROVOLJNE TRANSPARENTNOSTI PRORA UNA LOKALNIH 
JEDINICA: PRIMJER HRVATSKE
Sažetak
Rad analizira odrednice dobrovoljne transparentnosti prora una lokalnih jedinica (OLBT) 
u Hrvatskoj. Premda prora unska transparentnost predstavlja preduvjet participaciji gra ana i po-
boljšavanja ishoda u javnom sektoru, rezultati istraživanja su nejasni i neuvjerljivi, gotovo neposto-
je i za post-socijalisti ke, Þ skalno centralizirane države. Doprinos rada je primjena modela agenta 
i principala te teorije legitimnosti na primjeru jedne takve zemlje. Primjenom nelinearne panel 
analize na uzorku od 128 gradova i 428 op ina u razdoblju od 2015. do 2017. godine utvr eno je 
da lokalne jedinice s ve im dohotkom po stanovniku, brojem stanovnika, boljim pristupom inter-
netu, ve im administrativnim i Þ skalnim kapacitetom dobrovoljno objavljuju više prora unskih 
dokumenata. Preporuke ukazuju na potrebu reforme teritorijalnog i Þ skalnog ustroja države, pro-
micanja dobrih praksi prora unske transparentnosti u manje razvijenim gradovima i op inama te 
educiranja gra ana o prora unu. Glavno o grani enje istraživanja jest odsustvo kvalitativne analize 
dokumenata.
Klju ne rije i: prora unska transparentnost, panel analiza, probit, Hrvatska, lokalne jedinice, 
politi ka ekonomija 
 
